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Taking One for the Team: 
The Persistent Abuse of Eminent Domain 
in Sports Stadium Construction 
David Mark* 
“Possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, 
inherent, and unalienable rights of man.”1 
– Justice William Patterson 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
Take a moment, and imagine this scenario: You are living in a home 
that you have resided in for your entire life, one that you hold so close to 
your heart that you cannot fathom the idea of ever relocating.  You have 
been brought up in this home, have raised your own family in this home, 
and have a lifetime of memories in this home that you would like to ulti-
mately retire and spend the rest of your life in.  You have made improve-
ments to the home over the years that have appreciated its financial value, 
and you pride yourself on the aesthetic enhancements.  Your blood, sweat, 
and tears have literally been placed into this home that has given you con-
tinuous comfort, protection, and privacy.  Furthermore, you have built rela-
tionships with your neighbors and, together with them, have a vested     
interest in the community you live in, along with its development and well-
being.  
You arrive home one day, a day which was like any other, where you 
pick up your children from school after work, and had plans of cooking 
dinner for the family and enjoying a relaxing evening.  As you park the car, 
you notice a piece of paper taped to your front door.  As you approach the 
door, from a distance you see in big letters the word “NOTICE.”  You read 
the rest of the paper, and nearly pass out from shock, as you have just been 
                                                                                                                           
 * David Mark is a 2010 graduate of Florida International University College of Law.  He has a 
B.A. in Business Administration from the University of Florida and an M.B.A. from Florida Atlantic 
University.  David served as the FIU Law Review’s Managing Editor for 2009-10 and led the efforts in 
organizing the Labor Law Symposium.  He would like to thank Professor Howard Wasserman for his 
valuable advice on the article’s topic, as well as Sandra Friedrich and his parents for all of their love and 
support.  
1      Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795). 
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notified that your home will be taken from you and demolished.  Apparent-
ly, your local municipality believes that another property has the possibility 
of making better use of the land your home sits on, and is now using your 
state’s power of eminent domain in order to make this business decision 
come to fruition.   
After receiving the mandatory evacuation from this place you’ve 
called home for so many years, you receive word that the reason why your 
home has been taken from you is so a professional sports team can build a 
new stadium in which it could play its games; that the home that you have 
resided in, and put so much of your time, money, and energy in, is being 
taken from you so that basketball players, or football players, or baseball 
players, individuals who make millions of dollars a year, playing for owners 
who make even more than that, can have a new home where yours used to 
stand.  Unbelievably, a team that moves into one of these new sports facili-
ties may only play eight games there over the entire year.  To make matters 
even worse, the municipality about to take your home from you is not even 
offering you enough money to pay off your current mortgage.  
How could a story like the one above actually occur in this country 
where we have land and property at the top of our lists of things we value 
the most?  One author captured the essence of what property means to indi-
viduals in the United States when he stated that “Americans are serious 
about the sanctity of private property because they understand that it is not 
only inseparable from liberty but also the foundation of prosperity.”2      
Unfortunately, the story above is not a fictitious tale, and is indeed a reality 
on a routine basis.  The government uses the power of eminent domain to 
take private property from individuals, and although this practice is       
authorized by the United States Constitution, its lines are often crossed.   
This article will discuss eminent domain and its use when condemning 
land for professional sports facilities, and argue that there needs to be a 
bright-line rule for what the Court constitutes a “public use.”  For a profes-
sional team to acquire property through the government’s power of eminent 
domain, it is crucial for the future of property rights that the team demon-
strate a legitimate public use.  Part II will discuss the history of eminent 
domain and the power that the U.S. Constitution grants to the government 
to take such action.  Part III will then look at key eminent domain cases that 
courts have decided, specifically Kelo v. City of New London,3 and examine 
the multiple views that they have taken regarding the issue.  Although these 
landmark cases do not involve the construction of professional sports     
                                                                                                                           
 2 Nicole Gelinas, They’re Taking Away Your Property for What?, CITY J., Autumn 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.city-journal.org/html/15_4_eminent_domain.html. 
 3 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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venues, they apply to all situations where private property may be taken via 
eminent domain.  Part IV will examine state and federal responses to Kelo,4 
a case which this paper argues overly broadened the definition of what    
exactly constitutes a “public use” for the lawful execution of eminent do-
main.  Part V will examine the boom in stadium construction over the past 
twenty years and the lack of public and economic benefits that cities and 
states receive from such projects.  Part VI will discuss the implications for 
landowners and how the Supreme Court should establish a bright-line rule 
for determining whether a taking constitutes a public use, and begin to use a 
heightened standard of scrutiny in any case where the government chooses 
to exercise its eminent domain power for the purpose of giving the land to 
another private party.  Finally, Part VII will delve into whether sports     
stadiums should ever be considered a “public use.”   
II.  HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
“At the very beginning of our nation, Americans decided that the     
enjoyment of our property was among the most important rights possessed 
by citizens.”5  Our founding fathers clearly laid out the importance of prop-
erty ownership in a free society by providing in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence the common goal of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”6  
In his Second Treatise of Government, philosopher John Locke acknowl-
edged that the very protection of property rights is the primary reason for 
creating a government.7  However, abuses of the eminent domain power 
threatening these rights continue to persist in the United States.  Eminent 
domain is defined as: 
the right or power to take private property for public use; it is the right 
of the sovereign, or of those to whom the power has been delegated, to 
condemn private property for public use and to appropriate the owner-
ship and possession thereof for such use upon paying the owner a due 
compensation.8   
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 Christopher J. Duerksen & Richard J. Roddewig, Takings Law, In Plain English, 
http://www.commerce.wa.gov/_cted/documents/ID_1090_Publications.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 6 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 7 Carol J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determination of Public Use and Eminent 
Domain in Economic Development Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 43, 45 (2006) (“The great and 
chief end . . . of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property. . . .”). 
 8 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 1 (2007). 
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The concept of eminent domain dates back to biblical times and its 
power was used by the ancient Romans.9  In 1789, the French recognized 
the power of eminent domain and the requirement of just compensation in 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which    
stated, “[P]roperty being an inviolable and sacred right no one can be    
deprived of it, unless the public necessity plainly demands it, and upon 
condition of a just and previous indemnity.”10  The eminent domain power 
that the United States recognizes today derives from seventeenth  and 
eigtheenth  century legal tradition that prohibited the King from taking a 
subject’s property except by a duly enacted law of the land and with full 
indemnification.11  Within the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution the 
“takings” clause sets forth that “nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation.”12  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the    
takings clause applicable to the states.13  Breaking the “takings” clause 
down, we are left with two requirements the government must meet in order 
to enforce eminent domain: 1) The government can only take private prop-
erty for “public” use; and 2) the government must pay for it.  The “public” 
use requirement, as this paper will discuss, has been broadened to a level 
that the country’s Founding Fathers never intended it to be.  The “just com-
pensation” requirement ensures that the federal government, as well as any 
state, city, or government authority pays an owner any time the owner’s 
property is taken for public use, in an effort to ease the financial burden 
incurred by the owner for the benefit of the public.14  However, since no 
precise formula exists for determining what just compensation is, many 
people are left undercompensated for the value of their property taken,   
leading to frequent lawsuits.15   
In the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the federal and local governments primarily allowed eminent domain to be 
                                                                                                                           
 9 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 227 (1st ed. 1998).  “King Ahab of Samaria of-
fered Naboth compensation for Naboth’s vineyard.”  Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Duerksen & Roddewig, supra note 5. 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 5. 
 13 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 9, at 227. 
 14 Id.; see also William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 712 (1985).  Treanor describes James 
Madison’s rationale behind requiring “just compensation” under the 5th Amendment.  The requirement, 
according to Madison, evidences “pride . . . in maintaining the inviolability of property.”  Not relying on 
this principle and taking land without “just compensation” would dishonor the government’s commit-
ment to personal freedom.  Id. 
 15 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 9, at 228. 
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enforced in situations that truly were for legitimate public uses.16  These 
public uses included means which furthered American society, such as the 
building of roads, bridges, airports, hospitals, and public buildings.17  
Courts would eventually begin to expand the eminent domain power by 
allowing certain private companies to take property, such as railroads to 
build tracks, and public utilities to install transmission lines; but even then, 
these companies were highly regulated.18  They had to provide to the public 
equal access to their facilities.19  Thus, it is well settled that the traditional 
application of eminent domain was to promote public safety, public health, 
morality, peace and quiet, and law and order.20  
As time progressed, states began to abuse and take advantage of the 
eminent domain power by construing the public use requirement more 
broadly.  The public use requirement merged into a broader concept of    
public purpose, and no longer was it mandatory that the taking qualify as a 
public use; rather, now the condemned property could be put in the hands of 
private entities and developers that served to their benefit.  As a result, 
sports team owners are now able to convince politicians that building a 
multimillion-dollar facility in their cities will bring in enormous revenues, 
and in turn the politicians have the easy ability to acquire the land needed 
for construction. 
III.  KEY COURT DECISIONS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 
There are a series of eminent domain property cases that have shaped 
how property rights are decided today.  Unfortunately, the last in the series 
discussed below, Kelo v. City of New London,21 has opened the door wide 
open for private property to be condemned for a wide array of reasons   
beyond those that were originally deemed to be for a public use. 
A. Berman v. Parker:  The Expansion of “Public Use” 
In Berman v. Parker,22 the Court battled with the constitutionality of 
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 and the authority 
granted by this Act for a local agency to take private property and give it to 
                                                                                                                           
 16 The Castle Coalition, History of Eminent Domain and its Abuse, 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=512 (last visited Aug. 
15, 2010). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 21 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 22 Berman, 348 U.S. at 26. 
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another private entity.23  The purpose of the Act was to acquire, through the 
power of eminent domain, real property for “the redevelopment of blighted 
territory in the District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimi-
nation of blighting factors or causes of blight.”24  The Act had previously 
been challenged, but the district court held that the Act could stand, as it 
permitted the Agency to only condemn property for the reasonable necessi-
ties of slum clearance and prevention, with the court defining “slum” as the 
existence of conditions “injurious to the public health, safety, morals and 
welfare.”25  
The petitioner in Berman owned a department store in Area B, one of 
the areas of land that the Agency deemed for redevelopment.26  Challenging 
the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that his store was not slum 
housing, the petitioner argued that it would be taken from him and then put 
under the management of a private, not a public, agency and redeveloped 
for private, not public, use.27  The petitioner’s argument, in essence, was 
that the Agency would be “taking from one businessman for the benefit of 
another businessman.”28  His business did not threaten the public’s health or 
safety, nor did it contribute to the area that the Agency felt was a “slum” 
and “blighted” area.29  The Court, seemingly recognizing and agreeing with 
the petitioner’s claims, asserted “[t]o take for the purpose of ridding the 
area of slums is one thing; it is quite another, the argument goes, to take a 
man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive com-
munity.”30   
Nevertheless, the Court in Berman held that the Agency’s redevelop-
ment plan was reasonable, and that the Agency was permitted to redesign 
the whole area, rather than remove only the “unsightly” buildings.31        
Addressing the idea of transferring property from one private owner to an-
other, the Court determined that the public end may be served just as well, 
or even better, through a private enterprise than through a government de-
partment.32  The Court believed that there were other methods of promoting 
purposes of community redevelopment projects, besides public ownership.33  
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 31. 
 24 Id. at 29. 
 25 Schneider v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.D.C. 1953). 
 26 Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 33. 
 29 Id. at 34. 
 30 Id. at 31. 
 31 Id. at 34. 
 32 Id. at 33-34. 
 33 Id. at 34. 
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Furthermore, the Court maintained that it is the job of the legislature, not 
the judiciary, to ensure that public needs are met, and that “[t]he role of the 
judiciary in determining whether that power [eminent domain] is being ex-
ercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”34 
The Court in Berman ignored the rationale of the Fifth Amendment by 
broadening the scope of “public use,” which resulted in less protection of 
private property from government intrusion.  By allowing the property of a 
private owner to be taken and given to another private entity in order to 
cure a blighted area, the Court opened the floodgates for future takings that 
ignore the Fifth Amendment’s purpose.  This decision, in effect, expanded 
the definition of “public use” in the takings clause, by equating it with 
“public benefit.”   
B. Poletown  Neighborhood  Council  v.  City  of  Detroit:  The  Abuse 
Continues 
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,35 the issue was 
whether the city of Detroit abused its discretion in determining that the   
taking of the plaintiffs’ property was necessary to complete a project that 
included the construction of a General Motors Corporation assembly 
plant.36  In making its determination, the court looked to see if the City’s use 
of eminent domain constituted a taking of private property for private use in 
violation of Article 10, Section 2, of Michigan’s Constitution, which had 
been interpreted to restrict eminent domain to situations that further a pub-
lic use or purpose.37  The plaintiffs included a neighborhood association, as 
well as several individual residents who resided in the area where the con-
demnation was to take place.38  In order to bring in the General Motors 
plant, Detroit would condemn a total of “1400 homes, 144 businesses, six-
teen churches, two schools, and a hospital.”39  Together, the plaintiffs urged 
the court to recognize that a difference exists between public “use” and 
public “purpose.”40  The court was quick to point out that the two terms had 
been used interchangeably throughout Michigan statutes and decisions, and 
that the court had never narrowed the scope of the “public use” definition.41  
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. at 32. 
 35 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (1981). 
 36 Id. at 628. 
 37 Id. at 629; see also MICH. CONST., art. X, § 2 (“[Private] property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law.”).   
 38 Poletown, 401 Mich. at 628. 
 39 JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 55 (1990).  
 40 Poletown Neighborhood Council, 410 Mich. at 629-30. 
 41 Id. at 630. 
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In fact, the court severely broadened the requirement of “public use” by 
stating that “[a] public use changes with changing conditions of society.”42  
The plaintiff’s main contention was that the City was ignoring the con-
stitutional restraints on eminent domain, and using the power to condemn 
one person’s private property to convey it to another private person or entity 
in order to bolster the economy.43  This conveyance, the plaintiffs argued, 
“is really a taking for private use and not a public use because General Mo-
tors is the primary beneficiary of the condemnation.”44  The public benefit, 
according to the plaintiffs, was only incidental to the primary private bene-
fit of profits that General Motors would raise.45  The defendant’s argument 
was that with its facility would come economic uprising, increased tax   
revenue, and the creation of many jobs, and that the conveyance of the 
property to a private entity does not mean that the public purpose is the 
priority.46   
In Michigan’s Economic Development Corporations Act, it was stated 
that one of the main objectives to provide for the general health, safety, and 
welfare, was to alleviate unemployment by assisting industry.47  As the   
Supreme Court did in Berman v. Parker, the court in this case deferred to 
the legislature and its decision that the governmental action taken by the 
city met a public need (to rejuvenate the local economy) and served an   
essential public purpose.48  
Although Poletown was not heard in a federal court, this case essen-
tially set the precedent throughout the country, for widespread abuse of the 
power of eminent domain for private development.  Yet the outcome that 
resulted from the General Motor plant’s construction should have been a 
warning for future decisions on eminent domain issues when the taking of 
private property for private development is premised on the idea that a plan 
will cure blight and improve an economy.  Detroit’s $200 million invest-
ment to destroy the “blighted” Poletown neighborhood never paid off.49  
General Motors did not even meet half of its promised creation of 6,000 
new jobs.50  The 600 businesses that were taken so that GM could move in 
had likely employed more individuals than GM ever did in its new plant.51 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 631. 
 44 Id. at 631-32. 
 45 Id. at 631. 
 46 Id. at 632. 
 47 Id. at 630. 
 48 Id. at 632. 
 49 Gelinas, supra note 2. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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C. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: “Public Purpose” is Sufficient 
The petitioner in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff52 brought suit to 
challenge the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which allowed for the condemning 
of private residential tracts that were then sold to private, individual      
buyers.53  The Act permitted lessees who lived on residential lots within 
tracts of at least five acres in size to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority to 
condemn the property on which they lived.54  
The Court held that a redistribution of fees simple to improve a     
sloping economy caused by a land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the 
eminent domain power and therefore satisfies a public use.55  The Court 
looked at the precedent established in Berman,56 and found that it was a 
legitimate public purpose for the statute to target a suffering economy that 
was caused by concentrated land ownership.57  In rejecting the plaintiff’s 
contention that the transfer of property to private beneficiaries was unlaw-
ful, the Court noted that it “long ago rejected any literal requirement that 
condemned property be put into use for the general public.”58 
Midkiff redefined the takings clause, as it made the transition of “pub-
lic use” to “public purpose” in determining whether a use of eminent     
domain power is constitutional.  
D. County of Wayne v. Hathcock: “Public Use” Does Not Mean “Public 
Purpose” 
In County of Wayne v. Hathcock,59 Wayne County attempted to use the 
power of eminent domain to condemn the defendant’s private property so 
that it could construct a 1,300-acre business and technology park.60  The 
plaintiff, as the City of Detroit had done in Poletown, claimed that the 
park’s purpose was to “reinvigorate the struggling economy,” by attracting 
businesses.61  The defendant argued that this exercise of eminent domain 
would be unconstitutional under Article 10 of the 1963 Michigan Constitu-
tion (requiring any condemnation of private property to occur only if it  
                                                                                                                           
 52 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 53 Id. at 233. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 243. 
 56 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (the definition of “public use” is essentially the 
product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither ab-
stractly nor historically capable of complete definition). 
 57 Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 245. 
 58 Id. at 244. 
 59 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445 (2004). 
 60 Id. at 450. 
 61 Id. 
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advances a “public use”), and is not authorized in any state statute.62  Thus, 
once again, the issue facing the Michigan court was whether Poletown’s 
“public purpose” test was constitutional under Article 10, Section 2 of the 
Michigan Constitution, which states that “private property shall not be    
taken for public use without just compensation.”63 
The court in Hathcock set out three characteristics (all of which were 
originally discussed in Poletown’s dissent), where a constitutional public 
use exists when a condemnation of private property takes place.64  First, 
“[t]he exercise of eminent domain for private corporations has been limited 
to those enterprises generating public benefits whose very existence       
depends on the use of land that can be assembled only by the coordination 
central government alone is capable of achieving.”65  Examples include 
instrumentalities of commerce, such as when a private property is con-
demned to build a highway.66  The second characteristic of a constitutional 
public use from a private property condemnation, the court pointed out, is 
when the private entity who receives the property “remains accountable to 
the public in its use of that property.”67  The court had previously held that a 
private pipeline company had met the public use requirement when the 
company promised to conduct its business within intrastate commerce, used 
the pipeline according to how the Michigan Public Service Commission 
directed it to, and would be under the state’s direction and control to      
enforce these obligations.68  Thus, the public retained a measure of control 
over the property.69  Finally, the transfer of condemned property to a private 
entity is constitutional where the property that is condemned is chosen    
because of “facts of independent public significance,” rather than to the 
benefits and interests of the private entity receiving the property.70  In other 
words, if a condemnation of blighted property occurs, and the property is 
resold to private individuals, a public use occurs if the controlling purpose 
in condemning the properties is to remove them for the public’s well-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 454; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 64 Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 472. 
 65 Id. at 473. 
 66 See id.  
 67 Id. at 474. 
 68 Id. at 474-75 (citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25 (1954)). 
 69 Id. at 475. 
 70 Id. at 476. 
2010] Taking One for the Team 791 
 
being.71  This holds true despite the fact that the condemned properties 
would be put to private use.72  
After years of the courts giving a broad definition to the “public use” 
requirement of eminent domain by equating it with “public purpose,” the 
court in Hathcock narrowed this view and applied the three-part checklist 
above, finding the County of Wayne’s condemnations to be unconstitutional 
because the condemnation did not fall in line with any of the three ele-
ments.73  The park did not require the exercise of eminent domain, as its 
existence did not depend on the use of land that could only be acquired 
through the government’s power.74  Next, the park was not going to be   
under the public’s oversight and control to ensure that the property would 
continue to promote the health of the local economy; the primary result of 
the park would be for the private entity’s own financial benefit.75  Further-
more, “there [was] nothing about the act of condemning defendants’     
properties that serve[d] the public good in this case.”76  The court did not 
find any facts of independent public significance that would justify the con-
demnation, and the benefits that were cited by the County of Wayne would 
only arise after the lands would be put to private use.77 
The court’s decision in Hathcock addressed the question as to whether 
there is a distinction between “public use” and “public purpose,” an issue 
that the court felt was avoided in Poletown.78  In doing so, the court deter-
mined that there indeed is a clear distinction between the two concepts that 
had been equated in Poletown and previous cases since.79   
E. Kelo  v.  City  of  New  London:  The  Perpetuation  of  the  Broad 
“Public Use” Reading  
Just as it had seemed as though the courts were reverting back to the 
original meaning of the takings clause after County of Wayne v. Hathcock 
was decided, as well as other cases that narrowed the “public use” defini-
tion,80 Kelo v. City of New London81 was heard by the Supreme Court in a 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 475-76 (citing In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714 (1951), where the Court held that 
Detroit’s condemnation of blighted housing and its subsequent resale of those properties to private 
individuals was constitutional since it was to advance public health and safety). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 476. 
 74 Id. at 477. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 479. 
 79 Id. at 482-83. 
 80 See, e.g., Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 199 Ill. 2d 225 (2002). 
 81 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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landmark case that has had the effect of being arguably the most important 
property rights case in recent memory.  
In Kelo, New London was a city that was suffering with a poor    
economy, declining population, and an unemployment rate that was nearly 
double that of any other city in Connecticut.82  In response to these condi-
tions, state and local officials established the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity, in order to create plans that 
would revitalize the city.83  The NLDC proposed a redevelopment plan that 
consisted of seven parcels, on which a conference hotel, offices, restaurants, 
shopping, marinas, a pedestrian riverwalk, U.S. Coast Guard Museum, and 
approximately eighty new residences would be built.84  The plan was     
intended to capitalize on the arrival of the pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, 
Inc., which had just announced that it was going to build a $300 million 
research facility on a parcel of land immediately adjacent to the parcels the 
NLDC planned to redevelop.85  The NDLC claimed that the proposed plan 
would create jobs, generate tax revenue, revitalize the downtown area, and 
make the city more attractive.86 
In order for the plan to go through, the city council approved the 
NLDC’s plan and authorized it to acquire property by exercising eminent 
domain.87  There were nine petitioners overall, who owned a total of fifteen 
different properties on the proposed plan’s land.88  Lead plaintiff Susette 
Kelo had lived in her waterfront home since 1997, and had made “extensive 
improvements” to her property since that time.89  Another plaintiff had lived 
in her home for her entire life, since 1918.90  Her husband had lived in the 
home from the time they were married sixty years earlier.91  They claimed 
that the taking of their properties would violate the “public use” restriction 
in the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause.92   
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on prior broad 
treatment given to its public use clause, stated that “an economic develop-
ment plan that the appropriate legislative authority rationally has deter-
mined will promote significant municipal economic development, consti-
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. at 473. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 474. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 474-75. 
 87 Id. at 475. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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tutes a valid public use for the exercise of the eminent domain power under 
both the federal and Connecticut constitutions.”93  Thus, the court found that 
the economic development plan was constitutional and that the NLDC was 
able to enforce eminent domain since it was not acting for its own primary 
benefit.94  The dissent, however, strongly disagreed with the holding, and 
declared that a condemnation issue such as this one would have required 
“the taking authority to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 
public benefit anticipated in the economic development agreement [was] 
reasonably ensured.”95  The issue facing the Supreme Court in Kelo, there-
fore, was whether the city’s decision to exercise eminent domain and take 
private property for the purpose of economic development satisfied the 
“public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.96   
The plaintiffs urged the Court to “adopt a new bright-line rule” that   
establishes that “economic development does not qualify as a public use.”97  
The Court responded that “[p]romoting economic development is a tradi-
tional and long-accepted function of government.”98  The majority found the 
statutory language relied upon by the defendant to be valid and constitu-
tional.99  In doing so, the Court determined that the use would satisfy the 
Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement as long as the plan would 
serve a public purpose.100  The Court noted that “there is no basis for ex-
empting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding 
of public purpose.”101 
Thus, the Court in Kelo seemed to have determined that the factors 
that led to its decision were the “comprehensive character” of the city’s 
plan, and the “thorough deliberation that preceded [the plan’s] adoption.”102  
However, as one scholar has pointed out, “there would be no reason to have 
takings protection at all if governments . . . only acted in the interest of the 
entire public every time they took land [and] . . . had superior knowledge of 
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the anticipated consequences of their actions. . . .”103  The Court in this case 
only perpetuated the dwindling of private property rights by allowing for a 
broad reading and interpretation of the “public use” requirement.   
IV.  STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSES TO KELO 
There have been some states that have recognized how the floodgates 
for litigation were opened with the holding in Kelo, and thus have narrowed 
the public use requirement in order to curb the power of local governments 
to enforce eminent domain.  As the majority in Kelo noted, “[n]othing in 
our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions in its exer-
cise of the takings power.”104  State of Illinois legislators, for example, are 
currently reviewing legislation that would require compensation to be about 
twenty-five to fifty percent higher than the appraised value because many 
property rights advocates are claiming that the government’s power to    
invoke eminent domain is too easy.105  Illinois law currently reads that prop-
erty must be blighted before the government can take it via eminent do-
main, yet to these property rights advocates, the definition of “blighted” is 
too broad.106  
As protection for homes and businesses after the Kelo decision came 
down, the Alabama Senate and House unanimously passed a bill preventing 
local governments from using the power of eminent domain to condemn 
property for private development.107  The State of Delaware wasted no time 
following the Kelo holding, realizing the dangers that it could lead to, and 
just one month after signed a bill defining “public use” as allowing for emi-
nent domain to be used only for public buildings, utilities, and roads.108  
Even before Kelo, Colorado had amended its eminent domain law with the 
purpose of restricting the use of eminent domain by redevelopment      
agencies seeking to transfer private property from one private party to an-
other.109  The amendment requires that the property targeted for condemna-
tion be blighted or located within a blighted area.110  If the property does not 
meet this requirement, then it must be determined that without such a con-
demnation proceeding on the particular property, the urban renewal plan 
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will not be able to be accomplished.111  In California, using eminent domain 
for economic development is only allowed for the redevelopment of   
blighted areas, which the State considers to be a public use.112  California 
leaves little room for mistake as it clearly sets out in its codes what it con-
siders to be “blighted.”113  Other states, including Pennsylvania and       
Missouri, have also taken steps to ensure that the broad public use require-
ment set out in Kelo is not abused under their authority.   
Although these states have taken useful steps in granting the individual 
property owners who reside within their borders the property rights that 
were set forth by this country’s Founding Fathers, unfortunately many of 
the laws are not as clear as California’s and are poorly drafted to the point 
that just about any piece of property, including very good homes, can be 
declared blighted.114  Currently, a line separating blighted property from 
non-blighted property does not exist.  After Kelo, it is now up to the states 
to continue to expand protection to private property holders, and they can 
begin by establishing clear parameters of what constitutes “blight,” for pur-
poses of exercising eminent domain.  If not, there will continue to be these 
interpretational issues that will allow the government to declare a piece of 
property blighted without any grounds for challenging its decision.  For 
example, the State of Texas has passed a bill that attempts to limit govern-
ment’s eminent domain power by allowing the taking of only property that 
will be for the purpose of eliminating slum and blight; however, the legisla-
ture never set out a clear definition of blight.115  A proper definition of 
“blight” will establish that in order for the property to be condemned for 
redevelopment through the exercise of eminent domain, the property must 
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have a “grave, objective, and identifiable problem.”116  Defining “blight” in 
this manner would likely put an end to the ease with which the government 
can unnecessarily identify a property as one that needs to be redeveloped.117 
In response to the Court’s decision in Kelo, the United States House of 
Representatives and Senate have both proposed legislation to limit the 
states’ power of eminent domain when the reason for conducting it is so-
called “economic development.”  The Protection of Homes, Small Busi-
nesses, and Private Property Act was introduced on June 27, 2005 by     
Senator John Cornyn.118  In support of the Bill, Senator Cornyn cited to the 
Founders’ intent, along with Thomas Jefferson’s statement that the protec-
tion of such property rights is “the first principle of association, the guaran-
tee to every one of a free exercise of his industry, and the fruits acquired by 
it.”119  Thus, with the belief that the Court in Kelo failed to properly enforce 
the Federal Constitution with an effective deletion of the words “for public 
use,” the Bill states that “[t]he power of eminent domain shall be available 
only for public use,” with which the term “public use” “shall not be con-
strued to include economic development.”120  The Bill calls on Congress to 
respond to the overly broad eminent domain power that has developed and 
reestablish the fundamental protections of the Fifth Amendment consistent 
with its limited powers under the Constitution.121  Furthermore, the Bill 
targets both the federal government, as well as state and local govern-
ments.122 
The same month that the Protection of Homes, Small Business, and 
Private Property Act was introduced, the House, in a move that seemed to 
show its disagreement with the Kelo decision, took advantage of Congress’s 
spending power and passed an amendment to an appropriations bill that 
would deny federal funds to any city or state profit-making project, i.e., a 
mall or hotel, that took property from individuals through its exercise of 
eminent domain.123  In showing his support for the Act and distaste for the 
Court’s decision in Kelo, the House Majority Leader at the time, Tom    
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DeLay, stated that “[t]his Congress is not just going to sit by – idly sit by – 
and let an unaccountable judiciary make these kinds of decisions without 
taking our responsibility and our duty given to us by the Constitution to be 
a check on the judiciary.”124  One of the individuals who sponsored the bill, 
Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., said that the 
Kelo decision showed that “the majority of the Court had an utter disrespect 
for private property.”125 
A few months after the bills discussed above were introduced, the    
Private Property Rights Protection Act was proposed with the goal of pre-
venting any state from receiving federal economic development funds    
during any fiscal year in which that state exercises its power of eminent 
domain over property intended to be used for economic development.126  
The Bill sets forth a definition of “economic development” as “taking pri-
vate property, without the consent of the owner, and conveying or leasing 
such property from one private person or entity to another private person or 
entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax    
revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic health.”127  The Bill 
then proceeds to lay out projects that do meet the standard of “economic 
development,” such as roads, hospitals, airports, military bases, and pipe-
lines – all projects that the power of eminent domain was founded on.128  A 
definition of “economic development” as is set out in this Bill is exactly 
what is needed and what should be followed by the Court when determining 
if an eminent domain power is constitutional.  Enactment of any such bill 
discussed above would definitely sway state and city legislators away from 
the idea of eminent domain as the solution to their stadium plans.   
V.  THE STADIUM BOOM AND ITS EFFECT ON LANDOWNERS 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been a boom in new stadium con-
struction and renovation of the likes never before seen.  Between 1999 and 
2003, there were sixty-six major construction and renovation projects in the 
United States, which cost an estimated $17.3 billion.129  As of October 2007, 
sixty-five professional sports teams had either moved into a brand new   
facility or had made major renovations to their current facilities since 
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1996.130  Since that time, thirteen other professional sports franchises have 
made plans to complete new stadiums by 2012.131   
The driving force behind this stadium boom is money.  Player salaries 
and other costs for team owners continue to rise at an alarming rate.132  In 
response, the owners, looking for better ways to increase revenues and    
profits that they do not have access to in their current venues, pursue new 
facilities for their teams that will allow for financial opportunities stemming 
from additional sponsorships, licensing deals, and sales from luxury suites 
and other premium seating.133  This is when the owners go to their city offi-
cials, local politicians, and potential investors and offer them a list of so-
called advantages that will be brought to the city if it so chooses to build 
them a new facility.134  Should the city turn down such a request, it is com-
mon for an owner to threaten relocation, knowing full well that that there 
are many cities throughout the country that would love the “prestige” that 
comes with having its own sports franchise.135  Hence, the cities face pres-
sure to keep their teams around and take measures, such as executing their 
powers of eminent domain, in order to do so. 
There was a time when the construction of sports facilities, for the use 
by professional sports teams, was a purely private venture.136  The team 
owners would purchase the land and privately fund their stadiums.137  The 
owners would have to make do with the land that they bought, as their sta-
diums had to “fit on a particular piece of urban land, often within a set of 
city streets and having to accommodate many neighbors.”138  For example, 
the right-field wall of old League Park in Cleveland was a mere 290 feet 
from home plate, as “the owners of a saloon and two houses refused to sell 
their land.”139  This was a time in which cities, local governments, and the 
politicians within them did not abuse the power of eminent domain by    
taking an individual’s private property for the purpose of transferring it to 
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another for private use.140  Today, we no longer see this protection of the 
takings clause, as governments “muscle” homeowners and small businesses 
off their properties with claims of “public use” and “public purpose,” when 
in reality it is the private entities receiving the land who are getting en-
riched at the public’s expense.141  
The costs associated with a professional sports team, including the   
ever-increasing player salaries mentioned above, mean that the stadium 
boom will not slow down any time soon.  Therefore, it is evident that   
property disputes will continue to occur as the government takes private 
property at will for the building of these facilities. 
A. What Economic Impact Do Sports Facilities Really Provide? 
Raymond J. Keating, chief economist for the Washington-based Small 
Business & Entrepreneurship Council and an expert on sports facility    
financing, recently said, “[t]here is no dispute in the economic community 
about who gets the primary benefit from the subsidy. Obviously the clear 
benefits go to the team owners and the players.”142 In fact, polls and testi-
mony show that just about the whole country is against eminent domain for 
private gain, and it is clear that its main supporters are those who benefit 
from it: politicians, developers, and planners.143 
During a recent congressional hearing regarding the financing of pro-
fessional sports stadiums, held by the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy of 
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Arthur Rolnick,   
Senior Vice President and Research Director of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, replied to the idea of eminent domain by saying that “it’s 
an abuse to use eminent domain to take from one private company and give 
to another.  Eminent domain was strictly supposed to be used . . . to build a 
public institution, a library, a school, not a sports stadium.”144  In reality, the 
public benefits promised by sports team owners and government officials 
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rarely materialize.145  Such initiatives often take advantage of taxpayers’ 
money and become a public burden rather than a public benefit.146  
It has been estimated that half of the new professional sports facilities 
built over the last fifteen years were constructed after the eminent domain 
power was enforced.147  Eminent domain allows team owners to capitalize 
on the acquisition of the land since they do not have to dig deep into their 
own pockets to purchase the property, and even when the power is not in-
voked, the owners know that it could always be used as a last resort if the 
“teams encounter[] any stubborn landowners.”148  Owners frequently   
threaten that if a new stadium is not built for them, they will relocate their 
teams to cities that are willing to do so.149  The owners, cities, and advocates 
for a new stadium attempt to back up their desires with impact studies, 
which are often skewed in their favor by showing large economic          
benefits.150 
Similar to stadiums, there has been a recent construction boom of con-
vention centers, where government-sponsored economic studies are used in 
support of the projects.151  An urban policy expert who recently analyzed 
thirty of these studies that supported convention center construction found 
them “consistently flawed and misleading.”152  Relating to Justice Stevens 
in his Kelo opinion, where he stated that the New London Development 
Corporation “has carefully formulated an economic development plan that 
it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community,”153 owners 
are only having to show that a study has been done that shows that the po-
tential for benefits are projected and courts are not required to make a fac-
tual determination that a plan will meet any of its estimated goals.154  The 
dissenters in Kelo agreed that the redevelopment plan was intended to serve 
a valid public use; however, they believed the takings to be unconstitutional 
because the defendant failed to show “clear and convincing evidence” that 
the economic benefits of the plan would be realized by the community.155   
Despite the beliefs of local officials about the potential benefits that a 
stadium can bring to an economy, there is a majority of economists who 
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believes that this idea is fictitious.156  The people footing the bill for these 
new stadiums, the individual taxpayers, are promised that the stadiums and 
teams coming to play in them will bring thousands of new jobs, an increase 
in tax revenues and income for their city, and an overall feeling of greater 
civic pride and image that is associated with living in the same city as a 
professional sports franchise.157   
B. Flawed Economic Studies 
There have been many empirical studies conducted which show that 
the revenues brought in by having a professional sports franchise and    
stadium are modest, as the number of fans who attend from out of town are 
minimal and would have traveled to the city regardless of a team and fancy 
stadium being there.158  The spending at the stadiums produces a multiplier 
effect.159  Many of the large money-makers in professional sports do not 
even live in the town they play in, and thus spend their millions, and pay 
taxes, in other cities and states.160  Furthermore, a “substitution effect”    
occurs, where money spent at the stadium is only replacing the money spent 
on another activity; no new revenues are actually generated, as the funds 
that would have been spent at the movies or shopping mall, for example, 
have merely been redirected within the community.161   
Owners, teams, and leagues will almost always stretch the facts re-
garding what a new stadium could do for a city’s economy.  For example, 
the NFL estimated that the 2004 Super Bowl brought in more than $300 
million to the Houston area, whereas economists estimated that the number 
was closer to $65 million.162 
A study conducted and published in 2000 by the CATO Institute on the 
economic effects of professional sports facilities did not uncover a single 
instance in which there was a direct correlation between a professional 
sports stadium and a positive economic impact in the city.163  An example of 
a city that has not felt the promised benefits of a new stadium deal is    
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Milwaukee.164  Statistics show that since the city’s professional baseball 
stadium opened in 2001, employment has declined by 5.4% in Milwaukee 
County.165  Furthermore, the employment rate at the hotels, where the sur-
plus of visitors was supposed to stay, has dropped by 2.9%, and retail trade 
employment has dropped by 9.9%.166  Another city that never saw the  
promised benefits of a new stadium is Atlanta.167  The city invested in a new 
baseball stadium that opened in 1997 and brought in a total attendance of 
3.46 million people in its first year.168  By the end of the second season in 
the stadium, attendance had dropped to 2.32 million, a staggering drop of 
1.14 million total people from the previous year.169  
Furthermore, it has been estimated that an NFL playoff game costs a 
city around $425,000 in sales tax, possibly due to people spending less 
money at the stadium than they would out in the city, shopping and        
eating.170  A university economics professor and expert recently noted that 
the value of sporting events taking place in cities is typically much smaller 
than the hundreds of millions of dollars often stated.171  Example after    
example shows that cities never receive any of the promised benefits. 
There is also much skepticism surrounding the idea of an increase in 
construction jobs that stem from the building of professional sports facili-
ties.172  The construction workers who are put to work on stadium projects 
could very well be employed on other projects – the projects that the     
materials and supplies that go towards building a stadium could be used for, 
and which money that is given to a team (e.g., $1 billion of tax exempt 
bonds given to the N.Y. Yankees by New York City) would better be spent 
on.  Hence, a city such as New York that spends a great amount of money 
building stadiums incurs significant opportunity costs. 
Thus, it is clear from the examples above that the taking of one’s land 
for the construction of a sports stadium does not typically translate to a 
whole new prosperity within a community.  If this is the case, why then do 
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governments continue to restrain individuals’ property rights when the out-
come leads to no significant benefit?  Authors of a recent eminent domain 
study have warned that “[r]esearch has shown that without property rights, 
individuals will no longer face the incentive to make the best economic use 
of their property, be it a business or home, and economic growth will be 
limited.  Potential residents and businesses may avoid communities that 
have a record of taking private property for economic development because 
of a greater uncertainty about losing their property to eminent domain.”173 
In sum, public subsidies collected to fund stadium projects reduce   
public spending on local infrastructure, as taxes are typically raised and 
money is drained out of education, public safety, and other areas in need of 
economic development.174  This is likely why there has never been any evi-
dence proving that a sports stadium or arena built in a city will raise the 
level of real per capita personal income as is often promised by owners and 
city officials pushing for such a project.175  As Justice O’Connor pointed out 
in her Kelo dissent, “[t]he beneficiaries of [eminent domain] are likely to be 
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political 
process, including large corporations and development firms.”176 
VI.  RECENT AND CURRENT SPORTS FACILITY EMINENT DOMAIN CASES 
Bruce Ratner’s Atlantic Yards Development Project, as one author 
points out, “is a perfect illustration – only one out of many recent eminent 
domain projects like it – of how little today’s central planners have learned 
from a half century of failure.”177  Ratner is the owner of the NBA’s New 
Jersey Nets and the man who will be responsible for relocating 1,000 resi-
dents and workers in Brooklyn, New York if the largest private investment 
in Brooklyn’s history is allowed to go through.178   
In Goldstein v. Pataki, the trial court found that the principal public 
purpose of Ratner’s $4 billion project to build a stadium, along with resi-
dential and office space, was to eliminate blight, and therefore passed the 
“public use” requirement.179  The plaintiffs in Pataki were eleven owners 
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and renters of property on the land intended for use in the Atlantic Yards 
Arena and Development Project.  Ratner petitioned the state and city to 
condemn the adjoining blocks to the proposed stadium for the construction 
of 6,000 high-rise apartments.  The court used previous findings and stated 
that “a taking fails a public use requirement if and only if the uses offered to 
justify it are ‘palpably without reasonable foundation,” such as if (1) the 
‘sole purpose’ of the taking is to transfer property to a private party.”180  The 
plaintiffs failed to allege how having a professional sports franchise and 
new stadium would in itself not be a benefit to the public.181  The court also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations that the public use that would come from 
the condemnations are “mere pretexts” for wanting to “bestow a private 
benefit” on the development corporation, since that plan claimed that it 
would create large quantities of housing and office space, as well as a pro-
fessional sports stadium, in an area that is mostly blighted.182   
Similar to the homes that were taken by eminent domain in Kelo, the 
properties that Ratner wants the government to condemn are in no way 
“blighted.”183  The properties that would be taken include “two historic 
warehouses converted into fancy condos and sold at high prices just two 
years ago, a neighborhood bar that dates to pre-Prohibition days, and a 
flourishing arts-supply factory that employs two dozen legal immigrants 
and has recently opened a modest art gallery as well.”184  The property that 
would be condemned is in an area that has been described as “the crossroad 
of three handsome neighborhoods where brownstones routinely sell for $1.5 
million, restaurants long ago went gourmet, and affordable housing disap-
pears at an alarming rate.”185  According to one writer, [a] more ethically, 
economically and commercially driven crew would be hard to assemble, 
even in New York City.186  The three blocks that Ratner has selected for his 
project consist of artists, auto body shops, a world famous violin builder, a 
beloved neighborhood bar, and a hat company where ladies buy their hats 
for church.187  
Maybe the growth of this area is why Ratner has his eyes on this loca-
tion for his project. Notice that he has not asked the government to con-
demn this land so that he could build luxury apartment buildings among the 
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projects to bring upon economic development.188  A local print shop owner, 
whose store will be one of the properties condemned, is in disbelief, as he 
recently stated, “[f]or the greater public good, you must sacrifice your 
home.  Okay.  But for a sports arena we lose our homes.  I’m in a state of 
shock.”189  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
decision in Pataki, denying the plaintiffs’ plea that “the project’s public 
benefits are serving as a ‘pretext’ that masks its actual raison d’etre: enrich-
ing the private individual [Ratner] who proposed it and stands to profit most 
from its completion.”190  The court deferred to past federal court decisions 
rather than deciding to grant the citizens of New York greater property    
security, even though Kelo  suggested a state has the ability to do so.191  The 
majority stated that it cannot act contrary to the Midkiff standard, which is 
to say that it cannot disturb a determination of public use by elected        
officials.192  The plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court was denied, although Justice Alito obviously felt that the Kelo deci-
sion should be reexamined as he accompanied the denial with a statement 
that he would have granted the petition.193   
Another case that was recently heard in court involved the construc-
tion of the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys’ $1.1 billion stadium, which is scheduled 
to open in Arlington in 2009.194  There were twenty-one eminent domain 
cases that challenged the condemnations taking place so that this facility 
could be built.195  In one of the cases, the plaintiffs, owners of seventeen the 
condemned parcels, claim that the project does not fall within eminent do-
main’s permissible uses.196  According to the plaintiffs, the stadium plan is 
not a municipal project, as the city’s contract gives complete and exclusive 
control of the stadium to the team.197  The attorney for the plaintiffs stated 
that “[t]he city retains nothing of importance.”198  The city of Arlington 
claimed that the team is paying $2 million per year in rent, committing to 
staying in the city for at least thirty years, and is going to bring upon great 
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economic development in the surrounding areas.199  Threatened with the 
possibility of a delay in the opening of the stadium due to the multiple 
pending law suits, the city has now made moves to compensate the property 
owners a little more reasonably.  In November, 2008, the city of Arlington 
settled with 13 of the property owners who brought claims, paying the 
owners a combined $5.8 million, which is over five times more than Arling-
ton’s initial offer of $387,000.200  The $387,000 offer would have paid each 
of the property owners just $68,000 per home.201  
Perhaps the courts in the various states that are currently deciding on 
whether stadiums should be built in their cities should look at the recent 
court decision in City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc.202 in which 
a Massachusetts state court denied the use of eminent domain for the con-
struction of a baseball stadium.203  The Springfield City Council had voted 
to use eminent domain to condemn three privately-owned parcels of land 
for what they referred to as “municipal purposes.”204  It was recognized that 
the land selected for the condemnation was currently part of an urban    
renewal program, “in reasonably good condition,” and likely to create pub-
lic disfavor with any relocation costs associated with it.205  Despite these 
findings, Springfield’s mayor approved the taking, and the City was to lease 
the condemned property to the Springfield Baseball Corporation that it 
would then use to build a new stadium for a minor league baseball team.206  
However, the court held that “the primary beneficiary of the City’s contri-
bution to the project was not the public,” as the primary purpose of the   
stadium was to allow a private corporation to own and operate it without 
giving the City a dime for rent.207  
VII.  THE  NEED  FOR  A  BRIGHT-LINE  RULE  ON  PUBLIC  USE,  AND  THE 
NECESSITY FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY WHEN PRIVATE PROPERTY IS 
CONDEMNED AND GIVEN TO OTHER PRIVATE PARTIES 
In 1795, Justice William Patterson cautioned: 
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The Constitution is the origin and measure of legislative authority.  It 
says to legislators, thus far ye shall go and no further.  Not a particle 
of it should be shaken; not a pebble of it should be removed.  Innova-
tion is dangerous.  One encroachment leads to another; precedent 
gives birth to precedent; what has been done may be done again; thus 
radical principles are generally broken in upon, and the Constitution is 
eventually destroyed.208 
This statement should stand as a warning to courts that are faced in the 
future with the same type of eminent domain issue in Kelo.  Because the 
majority in Kelo greatly broadened the government’s eminent domain pow-
er while stripping individuals of property protections that the Founding 
Fathers believed in, there is now a need for a bright-line rule on what con-
stitutes “public use,” as well as “blight,” and furthermore, courts should use 
a heightened level of judicial scrutiny when private property is condemned 
for the purpose of giving it to other private parties. 
The major problem that the courts were faced with in the cases dis-
cussed above, and the main issue facing the courts today regarding issues of 
eminent domain, is how to interpret the phrase “public use.”209  The issue 
arises because the Court over the years has developed various interpreta-
tions of the term.  In one sense, the Court has defined “public use” as “bar-
ring government from taking an owner’s property for the sole purpose of 
benefitting another private party.210  In other instances, the Court has held 
that a taking via the eminent domain power “to achieve any of a variety of 
broadly-defined public purposes can constitute a public use.”211  The Court 
at times has defined “public use” on its face, meaning that the new property 
must be for actual use by the public.212  This definition requires that the 
government actually own the property, and that it makes the property avail-
able to the general public to use and access.213  In contrast, courts have in-
terpreted “public use” as synonymous with “public purpose,” “making it 
irrelevant whether the government itself, or some other private party, ends 
up owning the property.214  It is these completely varying definitions of the 
phrase “public use” that has left the government’s eminent domain power 
overly broad. 
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As the government has grown and its power has expanded, so too, it 
seems, has the initially narrow interpretation of “public use.”  In 1789, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the public use clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment was intended to limit the government’s eminent domain power.215  
Responding to the act of transferring an individual’s private property to 
another private entity, the Court found that “[i]t is against all reason and 
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, there-
fore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”216  In its decision, the 
Kelo majority never created a test for determining what is and what is not a 
public use.217  The idea generated from the Kelo decision – that private 
property can be taken away simply because another party believes it can 
generate more revenue from it – is a dangerous one that brings to question 
the safety of anyone’s property.  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on govern-
ment power.  Under the banner of economic development, all private 
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another 
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded – i.e., given to an   
owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more benefi-
cial to the public – in the process.  To reason, as the Court does, that 
the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary 
use of private property render economic development takings “for 
public use” is to wash out any distinction between private and public 
use of property – and thereby effectively to delete the words “for   
public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.218   
The Court’s decision in Kelo will always allow for the government to 
condemn private property if it feels that a business can bring more         
economic stimulus to a neighborhood or city.  The plaintiffs urged the Court 
that a line was needed, as “without a bright-line rule nothing would stop a 
city from transferring citizen A’s property to citizen B for the sole reason 
that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay 
more taxes.”219  In essence, this is a serious threat to all private property 
owners since there will almost always be a business that can generate more 
income than another private individual.220  The Court, with its decision in 
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Kelo, essentially made it possible for the government to justify any taking 
for a development plan of a private entity with the means to produce more 
money.  Thus, it is crucial to the future of private property rights for there to 
be an established difference between public use and public purpose when it 
comes to making a determination of eminent domain constitutionality.  
Leaving the determination of what constitutes public use as opposed to   
private use solely to the political branches would, as Justice O’Connor 
opined, render the public use clause “little more than hortatory fluff.”221   
At  the  same  time,  as  the  three  dissenting  justices  in  Kelo       
recommended, the Court must impose a ‘“heightened” standard of judicial 
review for takings justified by economic development.222  These justices 
believe that “clear and convincing evidence” must be shown that the prom-
ised economic benefits of a plan will indeed occur.223  If strict scrutiny is 
used, then a government’s taking of one’s private property for the granting 
to another private party would only be allowed if there was a compelling 
purpose for the taking, and the taking was the least restrictive way to     
accomplish that purpose.  Some may argue that the high strict scrutiny 
standard would be too much of a burden for the government to overcome 
when attempting to provide for the general welfare.  However, these would 
be people who likely do not realize how wide open the door is for the emi-
nent domain power to be utilized and abused.  But by applying a strict scru-
tiny review, it will show there will be no question about whether the pro-
ject, a sports stadium in this conversation, is vital to the public and cannot 
be completed by any other means than by condemning private land. 
Even Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo paves the way for a 
“heightened” review when he admitted that the Court’s reasoning “does not 
foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that 
announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a more narrowly 
drawn category of takings.”224  He noted that a heightened standard maybe 
should be applied in order to prevent private transfers that are laced with 
“undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties.”225  This belief 
supports the idea that politicians and legislatures who support eminent   
domain and the public funding of stadiums may have ties to team owners or 
may have their own financial interests in mind when making eminent    
domain decisions. 
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The situation in Kelo was quite different than the situations in the pre-
vious cases of Berman and Midkiff, where the government’s power of     
eminent domain was enforced in an effort to curb social ills in the commu-
nity brought on by blight and inequitable land oligopolies.226  Justice 
O’Connor, who wrote the opinion in Midkiff supporting the condemnation, 
yet dissented in Kelo, differentiated the two cases in that the neighborhood 
deemed to be blighted in Berman was made up of mostly properties that 
“were beyond repair.”227  This description of how the area was at the time of 
the taking depicts a situation that caused harmful conditions to the general 
public that the redevelopment plan had the main purpose of curing.228  Such 
was not the case in Kelo, where the homes condemned were not blighted, 
and the residents of the town were not in despair that required condemna-
tion of land by government in order to protect the health, safety, and general 
welfare of the public citizens.  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy, in his concur-
rence discussing the situation in Kelo, made three points that are easily   
distinguishable from any eminent domain stadium construction project: 
1.  This taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive develop-
ment plan meant to address a serious city wide depression, and the 
projected economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as 
de minimis;  
2.  The identities of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at 
the time the city formulated its plans; and 
3.  The city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that    
facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.229 
In response to point one made by Justice Kennedy, many takings that 
have occurred for stadium projects were done so in areas that do not consist 
of a “city wide depression.”230  Furthermore, it would never be the case 
where the identities of the private beneficiaries would be unknown at the 
time of a taking for a stadium, as it will always be a professional sports 
team and its owner.  Finally, it is likely impossible to determine a city’s 
purpose when it pushes for a new stadium, as the intentions of politicians 
and legislative parties could be for a variety of reasons not imperative to the 
public. 
A proper test for determining when a public use exists to allow a legal 
eminent domain exercise may come from Hathcock.  Using this three-part 
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test allows the government to strike a proper balance between its eminent 
domain power and the right of individuals to be secure from the taking of 
their private property.  Thus, first the government could see if the transac-
tion involved is a “public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracti-
cable.”231  These are transactions that could not be accomplished if not for 
government acquisition.  Second, government would use eminent domain to 
transfer property to a private entity, if that private entity is to remain      
“accountable to the public in its use of that property.”232  Finally, the      
government under this Hathcock three-part test would be able to use emi-
nent domain if the “selection of the land to be condemned is itself based on 
public concern.”233  Under this test, a “public use” can be more clearly   
distinguished, and the use of eminent domain to clear the way for a stadium 
will likely never pass.  
Easier and less costly methods exist for the government to orchestrate 
an urban redevelopment in hopes of boosting a weak economy.234  These 
options include tax policies, enterprise zones, small business loans, land-
scaping and urban design improvements, and the alteration of permits.235 
VIII.  ARE SPORTS FACILITIES A PUBLIC USE? 
Is a football stadium, accessible only to those individuals willing to 
pay expensive ticket prices, really a “public use?”  The concept of using 
public funds to construct a stadium goes back to the 1930s.  In 1930, the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio was faced with the issue of whether public funds 
could be the main source of financing for the building of a stadium in 
Cleveland.236  The Ohio court ruled in favor of public funding for the stadi-
um,237 in what began a trend that many cities and states are still       debating 
today.  In its rationale of determining that a sports stadium serves a public 
purpose, the court pointed out that both the Greek and Roman     empires 
constructed and maintained stadiums.238  Yet, it is a difficult to see a com-
parison between these historical empires (which, it must be noted, eventual-
ly collapsed) and today’s greedy sports team owners and players with lucra-
tive contracts who are the main beneficiaries.   
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Because professional sports teams are popular throughout the country 
and garner a lot of attention, many states have legislation that allows pro-
fessional sports facilities to be considered a public use and provide wide 
latitude for use of eminent domain to construct sports stadiums and        
arenas.239  Without a bright-line rule, courts cannot clearly distinguish the 
public use that derives from stadiums from other privately-owned enter-
tainment venues, such as movie theaters and theme parks.240  These quasi-
public properties, such as theaters, amusement parks, and hotels, have tradi-
tionally been viewed as venues for which the government cannot exercise 
its eminent domain power.241   
Further, if the government takes property that will serve both public 
and private uses, it will be an invalid exercise of its eminent domain power 
if the private use cannot be overlooked and the uses are commingled to the 
extent that they cannot be separated.242  In other words, the court must strike 
down the government’s use of eminent domain if the stated public purpose, 
which in most stadium cases is to improve the economic situation of a city, 
is only incidental to the benefits that will be confined on the private parties 
involved with the development plan.243   
As mentioned in the above section discussing the history of eminent 
domain, the land that was taken through eminent domain traditionally had 
to be equally accessible to the public.  How is it then that the definition of 
“public use” has become so broad as to include sports stadiums and arenas 
where customers are charged gross amounts of money to attend?  A team 
cannot claim that its facility serves a recreational public use such as a park 
when  one  has  to  dig  deep  in  his  pockets  in  order  to  step  foot  onto 
the property.   
Finally, besides the owners and teams, politicians are benefitting    
greatly as well, despite the fact that eminent domain powers are not bring-
ing the promised benefits, as “private assets are forced into the public 
sphere for political redistribution.”244  One author has pointed out that giv-
ing such a broad eminent domain power to legislatures that get political 
donations from corporate America (such as Pfizer, in the case of Kelo) is 
not a great strategy.245  Further, with no strict restrictions placed on what is 
deemed a public use, “politicians have figured out that eminent domain is 
an easy way for them to take land away from people who aren’t making 
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very good use of it – because they don’t pay a lot in taxes – and hand it over 
to others who will make “better” use of it – because they will be subject to 
much higher taxation.”246  Often times, politicians pushing for the construc-
tion of a new stadium try to sway others to their side to the extent that it 
feels as if they believe that this project would be the only conceivable way 
of revitalizing a city.247  Believing that some politicians may have their own 
interests in mind when it comes to a project they deem necessary to enforce 
eminent domain for, Chip Mellor, the president of the Institute for Justice 
and an advocate eminent domain reform nationwide, recently stated that 
“[p]erhaps it is time for government officials to take an oath like doctors 
and promise to ‘first, do no harm.’”248   
Agreeing with the idea that eminent domain is quite often used by 
powerful politicians to exploit those who are politically disempowered for 
financial gain, Justice Thomas pointed out in his Kelo dissent the destruc-
tive consequences that eminent domain has had upon those with which the 
power was abused.249  In fact, very few legislative policies exist that have 
done more to destroy minority communities.250  Most of the estimated three 
to four million individuals who have been forcibly displaced from their 
private properties as a result of “urban renewal” takings since World War II 
have been minorities.251  Now, after Kelo, minority communities will con-
tinue to be stripped of their homes and opportunities as many feel that this 
decision just affirms the government’s permission to take and redistribute 
land from the poor to wealthy commercial interests.252  As long as the power 
of eminent domain remains such an easy and cheap maneuver, politicians 
will continue to make use of it at the public’s expense. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
Now, take a moment and imagine once again the scenario laid out in 
the introduction of this article.  Five years have passed, you are now living 
in a different neighborhood, and the city that you were forced to leave when 
your home was taken from you is worse off than had it been at the time the 
government came in to claim it.  This is a reality, as the promises of eco-
nomic benefits of the newly built stadium that replaced your home fail to 
materialize.253  There is no compensation great enough to make up for the 
fact that your home was taken away from you with no reliable justification.  
As Justice Thomas stated in his Kelo dissent, “[s]o-called ‘urban      
renewal’ programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, 
but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to 
the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from 
their homes.”254  A study conducted shortly after the Kelo decision was   
announced showed that “protecting private property rights” was the number 
one legal issue that concerned the public now that this case had made the 
government’s power of eminent domain look so effortless.255   
Sports team owners have long lobbied for eminent domain as a way to 
acquire property in order to finance a multimillion dollar facility for their 
teams to play in, without having to dig deep into their own pockets.  Emi-
nent domain is a crucial power that the government possesses, and without 
it, redevelopment efforts in truly poverty-stricken cities could possibly 
strike a deadly blow to urban revival in these places.  However, without a 
definite rule of what constitutes public use and an acknowledgement that 
public use is not the same thing as public purpose, private property owners 
are left in a dangerous position of never knowing when their homes or 
businesses may potentially be taken away from them.  Where the federal 
laws have failed property owners already, it is up to state legislators to 
make proper adjustments to their own constitutions to protect the            
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individuals residing within their borders.  The Court should further apply a 
heightened level of scrutiny, as the right to be secure in one’s property is an 
essential foundation upon which the country’s Founding Fathers based the 
Declaration of Independence.  With the decision in Kelo, the Court con-
firmed the ease with which the government can condemn land from private 
property owners.  Under the rational basis review that was utilized by the 
majority, it is difficult to imagine any development plan that would fail the 
“public use” test.  Furthermore, the fact that courts need not make a factual 
determination that a proposed plan will meet any of its projected goals 
seems like an extremely low threshold to take someone’s private property. 
Even Justice Stevens, who wrote the decision in Kelo declaring that 
the power of eminent domain was constitutional for economic development, 
recently said in a speech that he would oppose using eminent domain if he 
was a state or local legislator.256  “My own view is that the free play of   
market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run 
than the best-intentioned plans of local officials,” Stevens asserted.257   
The Director of Environmental and Regulatory Affairs for the National 
Center for Public Policy Research understands the dangers that arise from 
the Court’s current view of eminent domain.258  In a quote that sums up the 
value individuals throughout the U.S. place on property and the danger that 
these individuals are susceptible to, the Director recently stated that “[O]ne 
man’s blight is another man’s castle.  Without proper restrictions and well-
defined parameters, governments will exploit the blight loophole and con-
tinue to abuse eminent domain power.” 259  Unfortunately, the blight loop-
hole has already affected so many.  For those individuals who have “taken 
one for the team” so that a professional sports team could play in the     
location where their property once stood, it is both the owners of these 
teams, as well as the government, who have taken advantage of a power 
that apparently is no longer governed by the U.S. Constitution. 
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